--- title: secret_in_client_bundle description: A secret key is in code the browser downloads. --- # `secret_in_client_bundle` **Severity:** warn, labelled *Probably real*. A secret key may be in code the browser downloads. The deploy goes on; Kaviris never blocks a deploy for a secret. ## What Kaviris saw A secret (a key that must stay private) is in a file that visitors' browsers download, such as anything under `public/`, `static/`, `dist/`, `build/` or `.next/static/`, or in an environment variable whose name makes the build put it into browser code: `VITE_…`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_…`, `PUBLIC_…`, `REACT_APP_…`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_…`. ## Why it matters Everything the browser downloads, anyone can read: open the page, view the source, and the key is there. With a Stripe secret key someone can issue refunds; with a Supabase service-role key they can read and delete your whole database. ## How to fix it 1. Move the call that needs the key to your server code (an API route, a server action, an edge of your backend). The browser calls your server; your server holds the key. 2. Rename the variable without the browser prefix, for example `VITE_STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` becomes `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, and read it only in server code. 3. Declare it and set it by reference. The warning's `fix` has the commands: ```sh kaviris secrets set STRIPE_SECRET_KEY --from-env STRIPE_SECRET_KEY --declare ``` 4. **Rotate the key** with the provider. It has been public. 5. Deploy again. Agents: apply `fix.patch` with `update_contract`, `approve_contract`, then `set_secret` without a value, and change the code as `fix.summary` says. Keys that are meant to be public (Supabase anon or `sb_publishable_…`, Stripe `pk_…`) only get a note; see [publishable_key](publishable_key.md). [All refusal codes](index.md)